Welfare economics by Baujard, Antoinette
Welfare economics
Antoinette Baujard
To cite this version:
Antoinette Baujard. Welfare economics. Working paper GATE 2013-33. 2013. <halshs-
00906907>
HAL Id: halshs-00906907
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00906907
Submitted on 20 Nov 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
GROUPE D’ANALYSE ET DE THÉORIE ÉCONOMIQUE  LYON ‐ ST ÉTIENNE   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WP 1333 
 
 
Welfare economics 
 
 
Antoinette Baujard 
 
 
November 2013 
 
 
 
D
o
cu
m
e
n
ts
 d
e
 t
ra
v
a
il
 |
 W
o
rk
in
g
 P
a
p
e
rs
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon‐St Étienne 
 
93, chemin des Mouilles  69130 Ecully – France 
Tel. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60  
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
 
6, rue Basse des Rives 42023 Saint‐Etienne cedex 02 – France  
Tel.  +33 (0)4 77 42 19 60 
Fax. +33 (0)4 77 42 19 50 
 
Messagerie électronique / Email :  gate@gate.cnrs.fr 
Téléchargement / Download : http://www.gate.cnrs.fr  – Publications / Working Papers 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare economics1 
Antoinette Baujard2 
 
November 8th, 2013 
 
Abstract. This paper presents the Paretian Watershed 
and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. It 
distinguishes the British approach (à la Kaldor-Hicks) 
from the American approach (à la Bergson-Samuelson) 
to new welfare economics. It develops the more recent 
domains of happiness economics, the comparative 
approach by Amartya Sen, and the theory of fair 
allocation by Marc Fleurbaey.  
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Welfare economics is the economic study of the definition and 
the measure of the social welfare; it offers the theoretical 
framework used in public economics to help collective decision 
making, to design public policies, and to make social evaluations. 
Questions usually tackled by welfare economics are the following: 
What is social welfare?  Is there a reliable and satisfying way to 
measure it?  If social welfare is based on individual preferences, 
can we derive a social preference from the preferences of 
individuals?  Are competitive equilibrium outcomes optimal in the 
sense that they lead to the highest social welfare?  Can any optimal 
outcome be achieved by a modified market mechanism?  Can we 
really formulate recommendations for public policies on the basis 
of such welfare analyses?  
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In spite of the uncontroversial importance of all these issues, 
some have been overshadowed while others have drawn enormous 
attention. From then on, the death of welfare economics has been 
often foretold (Hicks 1939a: 697; Chipman and Moore 1978: 548; 
Mishan 1981; Hausman and MacPherson 1996: 96). Setting out the 
history of welfare economics implies firstly to recall its evolution, 
secondly to discuss the reasons why it has almost missed its project 
—among others the role of interpersonal comparisons of utility, the 
subjective interpretation of utility, and the rejection of value 
judgment out of economics. Thirdly, we shall claim there are strong 
reasons to hope: welfare economics is back (Sen 1999a; Fleurbaey 
and Mongin 2005), yet at the cost of accepting the normative nature 
of (welfare) economics. 
The pre-history of welfare economics is as old as political 
economics: classical and neo-classical economists were studying 
the efficiency and equity of productive systems, more specifically 
wondering how to value commodities or labor, and to assess the 
best allocation of goods and of tasks for the society (Myint 1965). 
Utilitarianism which, since Bentham, aimed at providing tools to 
measure and improve individual and collective well-being, may be 
considered as the genuine root of welfare economics. From then on, 
the evolution of welfare economics marks up different periods and 
types of contributions. Following here Philippe Mongin 
(2002c,2006b), its history may be divided in at least four 
successive stages. First stage, the creation of the first tool of 
welfare economics goes back to Marshall —or even before in the 
works of Jules Arsène Dupuit—: the introduction of the notion of 
consumer surplus is meant to provide a method to measure relative 
change in consumers’ utility. They may derive some policy 
recommendations from the surplus analyses. But it was more 
clearly born with Arthur Cecil Pigou’s book published in 1920, The 
Economics of Welfare3 in which he has among others developed the 
famous distinction between private and social marginal cost or 
productivity4, the role of the size and the distribution of the national 
                                                
 
 
3Notice the first version of this book, Wealth and welfare, was published back in 
1912.  
4A private marginal cost is the marginal cost borne by the individual who 
decided the change, which is induced by the infinitesimal growth in the use of 
one input. The social marginal cost is that which is borne by the whole 
population. Notice externalities emerge in case of a difference between both 
measures.  
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dividend in measuring economic welfare5, and his defense of the 
transfer principle6. The definition of welfare was not really unified 
at this stage: it could be the ‘national dividend’ or a mix between 
the amount of the dividend and the distribution of income, and even 
something else. Second stage, the new welfare economics 
established a clear separation between the optimality conditions 
based on the Paretian condition and their applications to the 
market. The definition of welfare was uniformly based on strictly 
ordinal and subjective individual utilities. The best-known 
applications are the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. 
The question of income distribution, including when applying the 
principle of compensation, was then mostly left aside. Third stage, 
after the arrovian negative result tolled the bell knell in the fifties, 
social choice theory, public economics and the theories of 
inequality and poverty have been kept separate for decades. The 
only noteworthy element of continuity and unity is that most 
contributions were then welfarist, that is to say that the only 
relevant information for social welfare or public decision was 
individual utilities. Fourth stage, some post-welfarist economic 
theories of justice or fairness have been recently developed. Some 
economists suggest redirecting their research for example to 
analyze rights, or to integrate information such as talents and 
handicaps, opportunities and capabilities among others. 
This chapter is organized as followed. The Paretian watershed 
exposed in the next section marks the evolution from the first to the 
second stage of welfare economics and the formulation of the two 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The problems raised 
with both approaches of the new welfare economics described in 
section 2 provide some clues to understand the disintegration of the 
third stage. Recent and promising avenues for researches are 
developed in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
                                                
 
 
5There are some connections between the national dividend and our gross 
national product, standardly used nowadays to assess and compare social states. 
National dividend basically distinguishes from national income by its specific 
focus on the actual overall consumption rather than on raw production. 
6According to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, a distribution of income is less 
unequal when the rich become less rich and the poor become less poor, when the 
national dividend remains equal. This can be obtained by progressive transfers 
from the rich persons to the poor persons. On certain conditions, economic 
welfare may increase when inequality decreases. 
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1 –  The Paretian watershed 
1.1 –  The old and the New Welfare Economics 
At the turn of the century, Vilfredo Pareto introduced the 
concept of ophelimity in economics and, on the basis of scientific 
criteria, encouraged to narrow the amount of information we could 
derive from it: it should be an ordinal concept, and interpersonal 
comparisons of ophelimity ought to be ruled out. Would the term 
‘ophelimity’ not be retained afterwards, this watershed has yet been 
confirmed by the publication in 1932 of Lionel Robbins’ famous 
book, An essay on the nature and significance of Economic 
Science, in which he disputed the meaning of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility and the material definition of economics. As 
far as a subjective account of utility holds, there exist no way, 
whichever by introspection or by observation, to compare the 
intensity of satisfactions of two different persons (Cooter and 
Rappoport 1984). If assertions implying the meaning of cardinal 
utility or of comparisons, such as the rule of decreasing marginal 
utility7 are formulated, they necessarily derive from a value 
judgment. Notwithstanding, if economics claims to remain a 
science, hence to be value neutral, such comparisons should be 
absolutely avoided. 
Paul Anthony Samuelson (1947: 249) draws the consequences 
of the ban of interpersonal comparisons of utility, as well as of the 
restrictions of utility to the scientific theory of demand, by 
distinguishing the old from the new welfare economics: “While in a 
real sense there is only one all-inclusive welfare economics, which 
reaches its most complete formulation in the writings of Bergson, it 
is possible to distinguish between the New Welfare Economics [...] 
which makes no assumptions concerning interpersonal 
comparability of utility, and the Old Welfare Economics which 
starts out with such assumptions." 
1.2 –  The Pareto Criterion 
The only uncontroversial normative criterion at the collective 
level for the New Welfare Economics relies on individual utilities, 
as far as comparing utilities among individuals is not required nor 
even allowed. According to Pareto (1906: 261), “the members of a 
                                                
 
 
7Remind that a consequence of the law of diminishing marginal utility may be 
that giving one more Euro to a poor person than to a rich person is collectively 
better.  
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collectivity enjoy maximum ophelimity in a certain position when 
it is impossible to find a way of moving from that position very 
slightly in such a manner that the ophelimity enjoyed by each of the 
individuals of that collectivity increases or decreases. That is to 
say, any small displacement in departing from that position 
necessarily has the effect of increasing the ophelimity which 
certain individuals enjoy, and decreasing that which others enjoy, 
of being agreeable to some, and disagreeable to others.” A social 
state is hence said Pareto optimal if it is not possible to improve 
the situation of certain individuals without making the situation of 
at least one other individual worse off. 
Let us consider how to use this criterion. Compare different 
social states for a given population, where everyone has 
monotonous preferences over the commodities x and y. In state S1, 
the allocation of resources among individuals is fully equal for each 
commodity. Now, if individuals’ tastes are heterogeneous —some 
prefer to have more x while others want relatively more y—, they 
will find opportunities for exchange between x and y. In the social 
state S2, the situation of individuals who saw an interest in the 
exchange has improved while the situation of others did not 
deteriorate from S1 to S2. S2 is better than S1 according to the 
Pareto criterion as the situation of some has improved without 
damaging the others’. Nobody has a vested interest to go back from 
S2 to S1, and at most, some are indifferent. The fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics characterize this optimum, and 
specify the conditions of its existence (See subsection 1.3). The 
choice among different Pareto-optimal equilibria, notably on the 
basis of explicit value judgments, is the task devoted to the 
Bergson-Samuelson version of welfare economics (See subsection 
2.2). 
Imagine now that, in state S3, resources entirely belong to a 
single rich individual, while the others are totally deprived. The 
Pareto criterion does not help to compare S1 and S3. May the 
unequal distribution of S3 be repellant, the rich individual’s 
satisfaction would drop from S1 to S3, which implies that at least 
one person would suffer a downturn. As the Pareto criterion does 
not apply, no ranking between S1 and S3, or S3 and S2 may be 
derived. Hence a strict Paretian welfare economics is mute as to 
whether or not public policies should go towards state S1 or S2 
while in S3. More generally, it cannot disentangle situations in 
which trade-offs among the satisfactions of different individuals are 
required. However, most policies are likely to hurt some 
individuals or groups of individuals in order to improve the 
situation of another significant group of people. They imply trade-
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offs at the end, hence they rely on some kinds of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. That is why, after Robbins’ attack against 
the normative aspects of economics and especially against the use 
of interpersonal comparisons, welfare economics was likely to 
become silent for any policy recommendations and could have lost 
it raison d’être. The British version of the Paretian welfare 
economics provides some tricks to generate recommendations 
without, so they claim, involving any value judgments (See 
subsection 2.1). The new approaches to welfare economics such as 
the capability approach (See subsection 3.2) and the equity theory 
(See subsection 3.3) succeed in considering these situations and 
formulate explicit normative criteria to justify the trade-offs. 
1.3 –  The fundamental theorems of welfare economics 
The social optimum is well described through the fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics, which formalize some ideas 
already present in Pareto’s works (especially for the first theorem) 
and in Walras’ (especially for the latter). 
Oskar Lange, Abba Lerner, and Harold Hotelling have provided 
the first order conditions for economic efficiency, and the primary 
proofs of the first theorem. The problem of maximizing overall 
welfare amounts to maximizing the utility of each individual under 
the constraints of others’ utility, possible allocation and 
transformation functions, which is up to three conditions. First, 
individual utilities are maximized if the marginal rates of 
substitution for two given commodity between two different 
individuals are equal. Second, the aggregate output and the optimal 
allocation of goods among individuals are obtained by equalizing 
the marginal rates of substitution with the marginal rates of 
transformation between the two given commodities. Finally, the 
marginal rates of transformation of the different firms among any 
two commodities must be equal to guarantee the efficiency of 
production for the various technologies. Notice these results, now 
rigorously established, resume some economic laws previously 
discovered by the precursors of the marginalists, such as Hermann 
Heinrich Gossen in 1854, and by the marginalists themselves, such 
as William Stanley Jevons in 1871. 
Kenneth Arrow (1951b), Gerard Debreu (1951), and then the 
two together (Arrow and Debreu 1954) have generalized the proofs 
and these results. In formal terms, they have overcome the use of 
calculus, though intuitive to use for demonstrations related to 
optimization problems, by now using set theory. They have shown, 
with very few conditions, that the optimum more fundamentally 
derives from the price system. That is how they have formulated 
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what is now called the two fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics. 
The first theorem of welfare economics states that competitive 
equilibria are Pareto-optimal, if individual preferences are 
monotonic and if there are complete markets. 
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics states 
that one can achieve any Pareto-optimal allocation in a 
competitive equilibrium when the social planner undertakes an 
appropriate redistribution of endowments. Among several Pareto 
optima, some are probably more satisfactory than others. The 
theorem points out that the preferred social optimum can be 
achieved by a competitive equilibrium if accompanied by proper 
redistribution policy which shall establish the new ‘initial’ 
allocations. An important consequence of this theorem is that it is 
not necessary to alter the competitive system to obtain Pareto 
optimality. A trade-off between efficiency vs. equity is not any 
more required; however, the issue of the redistribution is pregnant. 
2 –  The new welfare economics 
Two types of approaches of the new welfare economics have 
been developed in the 1930ies and the 1940ies, which we may call 
the British approach on the one hand and the American approach 
on the other hand. 
2.1 –  The British approach to the New Welfare Economics 
As far as the only uncontroversial normative criterion is the 
Pareto criterion, welfare economics establishes a clear test: a 
situation is economically efficient if it could not be better for the 
individuals without decreasing some people’s satisfaction, which 
implies unanimity to justify any change. If it were nonetheless 
confined to such unanimous improvements, its object would be far 
too restrictive. The British approach, particularly represented by the 
works of Nicholas Kaldor (1939), John Hicks (1941) and Tibor 
Scitovsky (1941), essentially coming from the London School of 
Economics, developped a new concept of Pareto improvements in 
order to reach a decision and bypass the problem of comparisons. 
They propose a ‘Pareto efficiency criterion’ which considers the 
possibility of hypothetical compensations, and then applies the test 
of unanimity. Because the compensations are just hypothetical, 
they claim their consideration does not imply any value judgments. 
Imagine a single individual i looses x by a new public policy, 
while all others gain. The strict version of Pareto criterion cannot 
conclude that this policy should be implemented. Imagine now that 
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others gain of an amount that is greater than x. Would the winners 
compensate Mrs. i by transferring her the amount x, they would 
still gain from the new policy, while Mrs. i would now be at most 
indifferent. The change would be a Pareto-improvement, i.e. would 
be unanimously better, if such compensation were made. In all 
cases, this change passes the test of hypothetical compensations 
and is considered to be “Pareto-efficient”, then could be 
recommended. Economists are however not entitled to decide 
whether or not these transfers should eventually be made; such 
responsibility should be left to politicians on a second and distinct 
stage. This division of tasks between the economist as a scientist 
and the policymaker, as a politician, allows to comply with 
Robbins’ contentions, yet to formulate public policy 
recommendations. From then on, this general framework 
rehabilitated surplus analyses and paved the way to the widespread 
use of cost-benefit analysis. 
Extremely serious and skeptic critics have been raised against 
this approach by the leading experts in the field (Arrow 1963, Sen 
1979d, Boadway and Bruce 1984 among others). Firstly, the 
internal consistency of the model is challenged. Among others, this 
welfare criteria “could not escape the possibility of giving rise to an 
inconsistent sequence of policy recommendations, unless either the 
distribution of income and wealth or the forms and degree of 
dissimilarity of consumers’ preferences were assumed to be 
suitably restricted” (Chipman and Moore 1978: 578). Secondly, the 
normative aspects of this approach are strongly contested: even 
though it pretends to avoid interpersonal comparisons of utilities, it 
operates exactly on the basis of their existence (Cooter and 
Rappoport 1984, Blackorby and Donaldson 1990). Yet it does 
prevent any discussion of the value judgments involved in such 
analysis. Thirdly, beyond the problem of aggregation, these tests 
are more generally blamed because they are ‘welfarist’. A social 
welfare evaluation is called welfarist when it relies on subjective 
individual utilities only (Sen 1979a, 1979b). Amartya K. Sen and 
many others have shown the logical, pragmatic and normative 
limits of such account of individual welfare in the context of 
designing or assessing public policies. In short, Chipman and 
Moore concluded in 1978: “judged in relation to its basic objective 
of enabling economists to make welfare prescriptions without 
having to make value judgments and, in particular, interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, the New Welfare Economics must be 
considered a failure." In spite of such an acknowledgement, the 
success of this approach in occupying a leading position in most 
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contemporary works of public economics, industrial economics or 
international economics remains today unchallenged.  
2.2 –  The American approach to the New Welfare Economics 
What we shall call here ‘the American approach’ is associated 
with the position of Abram Bergson, from the MIT, and Paul 
Samuelson, from Harvard University, i.e. both coming from 
Cambridge (Mass.) in the United States. Bergson formalized the 
concept of social welfare in 1938 (Burk 1938). He defines it as a 
function of all the elements relevant for welfare: all products, 
consumer’s goods, the amount of work of each type, non-labor 
factors, characteristics of the environment, etc. Through the 
application of the Pareto criterion, the function may emphasize the 
“fundamental value of individual preference." The social welfare 
function, as eventually formulated by Samuelson (1947), is defined 
as a function of the individual utility functions that each individual 
derive from the social state. The shape of these functions captures 
some value judgments that are explicitly formulated. 
How can we legitimately decide which would be the right 
social welfare function?  And what does a "social preference" even 
means?  The question was notably asked by the logician Olaf 
Helmer to Kenneth Arrow when both were working at the Rand 
Corporation in 1949. Consistently, this function should rely on the 
individuals’ views, yet without resorting to interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Arrow (1963) provides a first answer in 
1950. He shows that, under certain conditions, it is impossible to 
aggregate the preferences of at least three rational individuals in a 
single collective preference, which would itself be rational (i.e. 
represented by a complete and transitive relation over social states). 
These conditions are the following: we must not exclude any 
combination of individual preferences (no restriction domain); we 
do not wish to resort to dictatorial decision (non-dictatorship); the 
collective decision should not contradict the unanimous preferences 
(Pareto Principle). Arrow also imposes a independence to non-
relevant alternatives conditions, which he interpreted as a ban on 
interpersonal comparisons of utility8. This impossibility is at the 
                                                
 
 
8This interpretation is though debatable. It has been shown that the independence 
condition also rules out further relevant ordinal information on individual 
preferences since it focuses on binary comparisons. This nuance has been taken 
seriously by the theorists of equity, so that they go beyond the arrovian 
impossibility, as we shall see below, yet still avoiding interpersonal comparisons 
of utility. 
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very least annoying: we cannot derive a collective judgment on the 
basis of individual preferences unless it is dictatorial. It is hence 
questionable whether the notion of collective welfare would at all 
make sense. For this reason, the New Welfare Economics seemed 
bound to a failure again. Fortunately, this prediction turns out not 
to materialize. 
3 –  A promising future for welfare economics 
Different challenges indeed need to be taken up to restore a 
future for Welfare economics. It should be possible to make 
recommendations of public policies; either interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are impossible and not required, or their 
meaning and their status should be clearly defended; a framework 
to explicit which value judgments are at stake is needed; it is 
necessary to go beyond the arrovian impossibility to legitimate the 
use of social welfare function. While the economics of happiness 
(subsection 3.1) has provided some positive evidences of the 
necessity to challenge the notion of welfare, the comparative 
approach (subsection 3.2) and the theory of equity (subsection 3.3) 
lead us to expect a promising future for a normative welfare 
economics. 
3.1 –  Economics of Happiness 
Back in the 1950ies, Richard Easterlin has examined whether 
income promoted happiness in the population on the basis of 
opinion surveys. In his famous article published in 1974, he has 
observed that, in a given country, people with higher incomes are 
more likely to claim to be happy. However in international 
comparisons, at least for countries with income high enough to 
meet basic needs, the expressed level of happiness does not vary 
much with the national per capita income. Finally, although the per 
capita income has increased steadily in the United States between 
1946 and 1970, expressed happiness recorded no upward trend in 
the long run, and even decreased between 1960 and 1970. Facing 
the Easterlin paradox, the standard public policies, which are based 
exclusively on economic growth, seem to be missing their target. If 
growth and wealth is not all what counts, the least would be to 
primarily identify the factors for happiness. ‘Economics of 
happiness’ is essentially a positive, interdisciplinary, and empirical 
literature. It describes what is, but does not study what ought to be. 
Happiness studies are interdisciplinary in the sense that they belong 
to economics, cognitive sciences, humanities and social sciences. 
Notice it constitutes an alternative to the standard economic model. 
First, it moves away from the revealed preference model and from 
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the usual assumptions of rationality. Then the overall satisfaction of 
individuals is at stake, rather than just the satisfaction they derive 
from the consumption of market goods. It consists in conducting 
econometric studies of happiness, emotion, subjective well-being, 
quality of life, life satisfaction —insofar as those terms are, in this 
specific context, interchangeable— to identify their factors. 
Measurement of happiness often relies on self-assessment scales, 
based on responses to questionnaires in which participants express 
how happy they feel. 
Since the Easterlin paradox, many studies have tried to explain 
why at the aggregate level, growth of national income did not 
necessarily enhance well-being. Among others, results of 
economics of happiness reveal that poverty reduce more happiness 
than wealth increases it; an increase of income for a poor person is 
more likely to increase her happiness that an increase in income for 
a rich person. Happiness can be enhanced by reducing inequalities, 
improving working conditions, the reduction of working time and 
in some cases, neutralizing the negative effects of unemployment 
and some school reforms. Besides, we learn that the influence of 
purely economic factors in the happiness of people is generally 
overestimated in our representations as compared with factors. 
However, unemployment and labor relations can have considerable 
influence in the lives of people. Unemployment kills happiness, 
even after individuals got their jobs back. Some think happiness 
may constitute a yardstick, and that it is possible to transcribe it in 
money measures, which allow cost-benefit analysis to be 
completed. 
Gathering information on the factors to enhance or to avoid 
decreasing of happiness, as well as on the measure of happiness, 
may most likely be of great help for policy-makers. It appears to be 
a particularly innovative and important contribution to 
understanding the determinants of happiness, for making ex post 
evaluation of certain public policies, and to complete the data 
needed by policy makers who should not be satisfied with 
economic data. Nevertheless, the analyses of surveys have given 
rise to many criticisms, at the methodological and the normative 
level. Some highlight difficulties to interpret the replies, challenge 
their reliability, and doubt cross-country comparisons are 
meaningful. More generally, the very status of subjective data is 
discussed. Would individuals be with what they have and what they 
do, they may be happy out of adaptation. This becomes highly 
problematic if adaptation is nothing but resignation. Beyond the 
methodological criticisms, some question its ability to formulate 
policy recommendations. At a pinch this research could justify to 
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administer tranquilizers to everyone, as it comes in Layard 2005. 
Though very few economists would seriously defend this view, this 
counter-intuitive example invites to beware of any possible 
manipulations of happiness indicators. Furthermore, economics of 
happiness describes what could be the target of a benevolent policy 
maker —as did classical utilitarianism–, but as a pure positive 
science, regardless of any justifications neither discussions of the 
relevance of the happiness criterion. Happiness may be important 
for individuals, yet this does imply governments are responsible for 
enhancing it (See the justice cut by Dworkin). 
Lucie Davoine (2009: 905) concludes: “happiness is a 
necessary but not sufficient: even though the economics of 
happiness can prevent a form of paternalism and ethnocentrism, the 
surrounding methodological doubts and the objections in principle 
induce not to consider happiness as the barometer of public action." 
3.2 –  The comparative approach 
Throughout his critical analysis of the welfarist approach (See 
in particular Sen 1979a,b), Amartya Sen suggested assessing social 
situations by considering quality of life rather than just utility or 
wealth. He developed the bases for the ‘comparative approach’ in 
general and the illustration of what it could be, the capability 
approach, notably in his Hennipman lecture published in 1985 and 
his first Tanner lectures published in 1980 (See also Sen 1987, 
1992a, 1993b). It constitutes an intermediate response to the debate 
on ‘equality of what? ’ which opposes welfarist approaches to 
resourcist theories. It provides rankings of situations based on 
explicit criteria of justice, and considers objective descriptions of 
life situations as relevant information to capture quality of life, i.e. 
an index of individual welfare as an ‘individual basis for justice’. 
On the one hand, utility, says Sen among many other critics, is too 
sensitive to adaptation, and on the other hand, resources do not pay 
attention to the particular individual ability to transform 
commodities into well-being. Quality of life may hence be better 
captured with functionings, which Sen (1985: 6-7) defines as “what 
the person succeeds in doing with the commodities and 
characteristics at his or her command. [...] It is an achievement of a 
person: what he or she manages to do or to be. [...] The alternative 
combinations of possible functionings a person can achieve and 
from which he or she can choose one collection” is called 
‘capability’ (Sen 1985: 7). At any moment, according to his 
situation, his tastes, his life plans, a person may choose some 
particular functioning among the capability set. The wider this set 
is, the more the individual is free to choose between different 
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lifestyles. The use of capabilities as an informational basis to assess 
quality of life therefore focuses not only on the role of commodities 
in generating well-being, takes into account individual’s specific 
ability to transform commodities into well-being, but also values 
for itself the freedom to choose their lifestyle. 
We should add two technical remarks and one further 
discussion. Firstly, as far as this information is objective in the 
sense that they are observable and measurable on a common scale, 
interpersonal comparisons are meaningful (Baujard 2011) so that 
the latter are justified and well accepted in this context. Secondly, 
the assessment of capabilities is based on some valuation of lists of 
different functionings, themselves being a vector of achieved 
doings and beings. Such multi-dimensionality is likely to cause 
moral dilemmas in certain situations, hence to generate substantial 
incompleteness. For instance, what if I have more health but less 
education or social relations?  A possible answer, specific to Sen, is 
to accept the rankings of social states may be incomplete. He does 
not indeed consider incompleteness as a relevant problem in the 
context of normative issues (See notably Sen 2009). Another 
approach is to gather each functionings into an index by weighting 
them according to their importance (Robeyns 2005a). Thirdly, the 
crux of the debate opposing these two different philosophical 
capability approaches lies in the question of operationalization (on 
this opposition, see Lessman 2006, Robeyns 2005b, Baujard 
2007b). Following Aristotle, Martha Nussbaum believes that there 
is a single notion of the human good, virtues and flourishing life 
(Nussbaum 1988, 1993). This leads to propose a concrete and 
comprehensive list of functionings, so that the approach belongs to 
fundamental universalism. Operational applications are therefore 
implementable for scientists (Alkire , Robeyns 2006). The fact that 
values and weighting are determined by scientists rather than by the 
individuals themselves explains why this approach is often 
criticized for its paternalism. In contrast, Sen’s position meets 
certain relativism, in order to give to public deliberation the main 
role in a democracy. Therefore, he refuses to provide a clear list of 
functionings which could measure well-being for everyone on a 
common scale. It is therefore difficult to implement a mere 
application of Sen’s capability approach since it fundamentally 
relies on the public debate. The latter is the only legitimate place to 
decide which moral values should be at stake, hence to retain 
specific lists of functionings and, eventually, to measure 
capabilities. 
The extremely extensive literature on the capability approach, 
at least since the 2000s, is but a multi-dimensional analysis of 
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living conditions, for which the UNDP human development index 
(HDI) is only one very rough illustration. As the approach was 
generalizing, it has yet lost its specificity, which was to pay special 
attention to the value of freedom, understood as the possibility for 
everyone to live the life one has reason to value. 
3.3 –  Equity theory 
The theory of fairness or equity theory, including fair 
allocations theory and even applications to public economics, 
borrowed the axiomatic methods from social choice theory and the 
theory of bargaining to study the implications of equity criteria in 
the framework of Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model. 
Different fairness criteria can be contemplated for division 
rules. The idea of ‘no-envy’ was independently introduced by Jan 
Tinbergen (1953), Duncan Foley (1967) and developped by Serge-
Christophe Kolm (1971), Allan Feldman and Alan Kirman (1974). 
An allocation is ‘envy-free’ if no individual would like better 
anybody else’s basket. A fundamental result of equity theory is 
such that the competitive equilibrium with equal endowments, that 
is to say equal budgets, satisfies both the criteria of no-envy and 
Pareto. Refinements of such analyses were first conducted in the 
context of distribution of a consumption economy without 
production, then to study equal opportunities, incentives and 
optimal taxation, division of a single divisible good with single-
peaked or monotonic preferences, the allocation of several 
commodities, the properties of a production economy... 
The no-envy criterion, however, may conflict with the criterion 
of efficiency. This was proved by Elisha Pazner and David 
Schmeidler in 1974: no allocation respects Pareto efficiency and 
fairness (as no-envy) in the context of production with unequal 
skills —in other words with production handicaps. This 
impossibility result can be interpreted as the incompatibility 
between a principle of reward and a principle of compensation. The 
non-envy test indeed requires that the allocation of individuals with 
identical preferences must be on the same indifference curve. 
According to the principle of reward, individuals with similar 
talents should not envy each other, since it should not be any 
different treatment for different preferences. And, according to the 
principle of compensation, individuals who have identical 
preferences should have the same benefit, eliminating the 
inequalities due to talents. 
The same authors proposed in 1978 another test of fairness 
based on egalitarian equivalent allocations. An allocation is 
egalitarian-equivalent when each one is indifferent between the 
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basket of goods in the allocation and the basket she would have in 
an egalitarian economy. In this perspective, Marc Fleurbaey and 
François Maniquet (2005)—among other similar contributions—
considered the introduction of skills heterogeneity, and studied the 
consistency between compensation of skills inequalities and the 
condition of equal access to resources for all preferences. To 
deepen the subject of responsibility and unequal handicaps, see 
Fleurbaey (2008) and, for a comprehensive presentation of the 
economic theory of fairness, see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011). 
The theory of equity took up the different challenges welfare 
economics was facing. First, it’s worth noticing it eventually 
overcame the arrovian impossibility. Second, it did reject 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. Unlike standard economics 
which relies on the model of subjective revealed preferences, 
welfare is here described as an index of resources; and unlike the 
comparative approach, they still keep some account of individual 
ordinal preferences, which avoids the risk of paternalism. Third, the 
theory of fairness accepts the challenge of value judgments 
transparency in making clear the criteria of justice.  
4 –  Conclusion 
Public policies are expected to increase social welfare. Welfare 
economics aims at providing the framework to accomplish such 
goal, developing a wide range of techniques to adapt different 
situations. But looking careful, we have seen this wonderful 
textbook world may be gloomier than it seems at first sight. Is 
welfare economics bound to death because of its difficulty to 
handle value judgments?  Recommendations are indeed always 
linked with some normative involvement, even through the 
undebated Pareto criterion. Beyond, welfare economics suffers 
from the fact that a necessary discussion on the very definition of 
welfare had been shirked for too long (Baujard 2011). What is 
indeed welfare?  How can we justify this or that meaning of 
welfare for public policy?  Pareto or Pigou acknowledge that 
overall welfare is much more, or even different, than economic 
welfare9. Yet Pareto developed a pure theory of ophelimity which 
was afterwards taken as such by economists. Pigou eventually 
                                                
 
 
9We here refer to the distinction of utility and ophelimity for Pareto, and the 
distinction between total welfare and economic welfare by Pigou. Pigou (1920 : 
20-33) for instance argues the difference is meaningful as soon as you pay 
attention to time and interactions.  
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focused on economic welfare, and especially on the national 
dividend; from then on GDP appeared as an acceptable 
approximation of welfare for decades. These assumptions are today 
more and more debated. 
Among others, it seems now generally accepted that GDP is a 
questionable goal, and the definition of welfare becomes a topic of 
discussion. The theory of fairness and social welfare, which took 
over all challenges faced by welfare economics, now provides a 
unified approach of social choice theory, the theory of fair 
allocations and public economics. Sen’s capability approach 
rehabilitates the role of public debate and reintroduces democracy 
in economics. All is there to expect a promising future for (welfare) 
economics. 
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